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3 THE BRACERO PROGRAM AND ITS AFTERMATH:
AN HISTORICAL SUMMARY //

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THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE //

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INTRODUCTION

The expiration in December, 1964 of Public Law 78, better known as the Bracero Program, has lead to a great deal of comment in the press and in the agricultural community. Since the conditions and availability of farm labor affects everyone in the State of California, the following historical summary of the Bracero Program and its aftermath may be helpful. This material was prepared by the Assembly Legislative Reference Service and the Staff of the Assembly Committee on Agriculture.

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The term braceros -- "strong-armed ones"-- refers to Mexican agricultural workers brought into the United States on relatively short-term work contracts. Beginning in September 1942, Mexicans entered California to work in the fields under a program arranged by an exchange of notes between the Mexican and American governments.¹

The initiation of the Bracero Program was directly related to the severe lack of manpower caused by World War II. After the war was over, the number of braceros brought into the State declined, but the program itself continued.² By the early 1950's the need for agricultural labor had again increased, due to the Korean War and the expansion of non-agricultural jobs. In July 1951, Congress passed Public Law 78, the Mexican Farm Labor Program, and in August 1951, the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951 was concluded between the United States and Mexico authorizing

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1. Ernesto Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields, Joint United States-Mexico Trade Union Committee, Washington, D.C., 1956, p. 5. Actually, the use of Mexican labor in California extends at least back as far as World War I. Between 1910 and 1930 approximately 700,000 Mexicans entered the U.S. as legal immigrants. The dissatisfaction of the Mexican government at this rapid depopulation combined with the American depression to halt this stream. In 1931 legislation was passed by Mexico to regulate further migrations. Nevertheless, by 1940, about a million and a half Mexicans were living in the United States preponderantly in Texas, Arizona, and California. (California Department of Employment, Mexican Nationals in California Agriculture, Sacramento, 1959, p. 1 and Galarza, Merchants of Labor, San Jose, 1964, pp. 28-29).
 2. Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields, p. 6.

the contracting of Mexican farm workers. Thus, by law, both countries gave a permanence to earlier executive agreements for alien contract labor. Since 1951 the provisions of Public Law 78 were extended a number of times for a limited duration. Then, in May 1963, Congress voted against further extension of the program and PL 78 was allowed to expire on 31 December 1964.

The purpose of the Mexican Farm Labor Program was twofold: (1) to supply Mexican agricultural workers (braceros) in order to alleviate shortages in the domestic farm work force while (2) protecting the domestic farm work force from adverse effects of the importation of Mexican agricultural workers. Under the program the braceros could be used only where domestic labor was unavailable. The employer requesting braceros had first to make reasonable efforts to obtain domestic farm labor. He also was required to meet other criteria relating to offering minimum standards in housing facilities, wages, etc.³

In addition to the bracero program there were other means by which Mexican laborers entered the labor market. Several ways were afforded by the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act (PL 414) by Congress in 1952. This law remains as the United States' basic immigration act. Mexicans who enter under 414 are referred to as "green cards." "Green cards" are aliens with residence rights up to three years and ultimate possibility of citizenship. Under the provisions of PL 414 an employer may request the entry of a Mexican into the United States for the purpose of working.

3. Senate Fact Finding Committee on Labor and Welfare, California's Farm Labor Problems, Part I, California State Senate, Sacramento, 1961, pp. 84-87.

As of 1963, the Department of Employment and the Bureau of Employment estimated that there were between 32,000 and 38,000 "green cards" employed in agriculture in California. Other "green cards" who entered as agricultural workers are no longer employed in agriculture. "Green cards" reside in all areas of the State, but some "green cards" and some American citizens still reside in Mexico and enter California for employment purposes daily. These "border-crossers" for which no completely accurate count exists also work in both agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits, and constitute a significant factor in the labor pool of San Diego and Imperial Counties.

Illegal immigrants have provided another source of agricultural labor. These Mexicans are called "wetbacks" from the fact that many of them originally crossed the border by swimming or wading the Rio Grande. In 1954 an estimated total of 1,075,168 wetbacks entered the United States,⁴ and approximately 84,000 wetbacks were deported from California.⁵ In 1963 the United States Border Patrol located 38,866 deportable Mexican

4. Representative Donald Clausen, Congressional Record, 29 May 1963, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1963 p. 9267.

5. California's Farm Labor Problems, Part I, p. 72.

aliens, a number which represents over half the deportable aliens found in the United States for all countries in the world for that year.⁶ The Border Patrol has apprehended 1,022,267 deportable Mexican aliens in the past ten years, mostly during the mid-1950's, and "most of this occurred in the southwestern United States where many aliens were seeking employment in agriculture."⁷

The size of the Bracero Program in the United States fluctuated: 35,345 workers were admitted in 1948; 445,197 in 1956; and 177,736 in 1964. The increase in bracero entries during the mid-1950's coincided with the federal crackdown on illegal immigrants, but in recent years the number of braceros brought in under the provisions of Public Law 78 has steadily declined. For reasons previously suggested, the impact of Mexican workers on the domestic farm labor market exceeded that indicated by these figures. The entry of other Mexican Nationals -- "green cards", "wetbacks" and aliens with false papers -- indicates that it is unrealistic to think that only those Mexicans who entered California under the Bracero Program

6. Fred H. Schmidt, After the Bracero, A report submitted to the Department of Employment of the State of California by the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Los Angeles, October, 1964, p. 19.

7. Ibid., p. 19.

entered the labor market.⁸ Even with these considerations, however, it would appear that the total number of Mexican Nationals employed in California agriculture has been declining.

The history of the Bracero Program in California is similar to its history in the United States in general. In 1953, California used an average of 25,300 braceros. The peak year was 1957 when an average of 51,300 Mexican workers were employed.⁹ In 1963 and in 1964, the last two years of the program's life, California averaged over 26,700 braceros in each year.¹⁰

In 1957, the peak year for bracero employment, foreign contract workers composed 34.2% of the average seasonal work force in agriculture.¹¹ (With minor exceptions, foreign contract workers were braceros.) In 1964 the percentage dropped to 9%.¹²

California's utilization of braceros has varied from crop to crop. In 1962 Mexican Nationals made up 79.9% of the temporary work force in the harvesting of tomatoes. The percentage of Mexicans among the temporary workers employed in the lettuce crop was 71.4 and in the lemon crop, 81.6.¹³ In 1964,

8. Ibid., pp. 19-20

9. Mexican Nationals in California Agriculture, p. 4.

10. Jean Cohn, California Department of Employment, Research and Statistics, 18 February 1965.

11. Senate Fact Finding Committee on Labor and Welfare, California's Farm Labor Problems, Part II, p. 74.

12. California Department of Employment, Research and Statistics, 23 February 1965.

13. California's Farm Labor Problems, Part II, p. 74.

the last year of the Bracero Program, the figures were: 84%, tomatoes; 74%, lettuce; and 74%, lemons.¹⁴ Only 12 crops used over 1,000 braceros in 1963, and two crops, tomatoes and strawberries, used over half of the braceros who entered the State.¹⁵

Certain counties in California have been more dependent upon foreign contract workers than other counties. Imperial County, for example, obtained 78.2% of her seasonal labor from foreign contract sources for the peak year of 1957. In 1962 the percentage was 55.8. In 1957 San Diego County derived 92.2% of her temporary labor from this source. In 1962 she depended upon foreign contract labor to the extent of 27.7%. Other counties of high dependence were Monterey, Riverside, San Joaquin, Ventura and Yolo.¹⁶ In 1963, Mexican Nationals made up about 40% of Monterey County's agricultural labor force.¹⁷

The purpose of the Mexican Farm Labor Program was to supply workers for the shortages in the existing domestic farm labor supply, while protecting the domestic farm worker from the adverse effects of the importation of Mexican agricultural workers on

14. California Department of Employment, Research and Statistics, 23 February 1965.

15. University of California, Division of Agricultural Sciences, California Agricultural Labor Requirements and Adjustments.

16. California Farm Labor Problems, Part I, p. 103; Part II, p. 74.

17. University of California, Division of Agricultural Sciences, California Agricultural Labor Requirements and Adjustments, September, 1964, p. 11.

wages and working conditions. It has been claimed by many parties that the Bracero Program adversely affected both the working conditions and the wages of domestic workers.

The 1961 report of the California Senate Fact Finding Committee on Labor and Welfare found some truth in these allegations. The report pointed out that the Bracero Program had been used by farmers in some areas of the State to freeze wages at low levels, that domestic labor was being discriminated against in favor of the braceros and that farmers and farm associations who hired braceros actively impeded domestics from applying for work or harassed them to the point of not returning once they were hired.¹⁸ Although the Committee felt that the continuation of the Bracero Program would cause farm labor users to "postpone ... efforts to solve their seasonal labor shortages by means other than availing themselves of Mexican workers," they predicted, nevertheless, that the end of the Bracero Program "would be devastating to vast segments of this State's agriculture, and irreparably damaging to California's economy as a whole."¹⁹

In 1963 when Congress voted to end the Bracero Program as of December 31, 1964, the action was hailed as both the end of contract labor in America, "one of the ugliest chapters in

18. California's Farm Labor Problems, Part I., pp. 114-124.

19. California's Farm Labor Problems, Part I, p. 125.

the history of common man," and protested as an utter disaster for the California farmer.²⁰ Following the Congressional action in May 1963, California growers became increasingly interested in the green cards as a source of farm labor. The United States Department of Labor also became more concerned with Public Law 414, the legal vehicle for importing green cards from Mexico. Prior to July 1963 only the sponsoring of 25 or more workers by any individual employer required a certification by the Secretary of Labor that no domestic workers were available. After July, each individual application under PL 414 required a certification that no domestic workers were available.

As the Bracero Program's expiration date of December 1964 neared, the growers urged that a program be set up under PL 414 for re-admitting Mexican labor after the end of the year or for transforming PL 78 Mexican braceros into PL 414 Mexican green cards right where they stood in the fields.²¹ The AFL-CIO and other critics of the Bracero Program opposed any such extension

20. From the Mexican standpoint, the Bracero Program has been criticized as retarding Mexico's economic development, and debasing her citizens, and hailed as Mexico's third most important source of American dollars and as one of American's most successful people-to-people foreign aid programs. See Ernesto Galarza, Strangers in Our Fields, and Richard Hancock, The Role of the Bracero in the Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico.

21. Mary Ellen Leary, "As the Braceros Leave," The Reporter, 28 January 1965, p. 44.

of Mexican importation as clearly contrary to the will of Congress. Attention, nevertheless, turned to PL 414 as a means of admitting supplemental farm laborers from Mexico.

While PL 78 was still in effect, Florida annually imported an average of 12,000 agricultural workers from the British West Indies under PL 414, and a much smaller number of Japanese and Filipinos were brought into California for the same purpose. The operation of PL 414 in the latter instance has been described as follows:²²

Since 1956 California farm employers have also used a limited number of Japanese and Filipino National farm workers who have been temporarily admitted to the United States under the authorization granted by PL 414 (8 U.S.C.A. 1101 (a) (15) (H) (ii)). In December, 1960, there were 1,730 Japanese workers in this State, most of whom (1,350) were employed in the South Coast area. The number of Filipinos used has never exceeded 28, in 1957, and by December, 1960, all of these workers had returned to their homeland. Although the value of this program as a source of agricultural labor is very small statewide, it has been of importance to specific areas.

The Japanese, Philippine, and United States governments have informal agreements relative to these importations as contrasted to the formal Migrant Labor Agreement used in the Mexican National program. However, the general rules of the program and the provisions of the contract used as they relate to wages, housing, transportation, and work activities permitted are comparable.

To obtain Japanese or Filipino workers an employer, again usually a farm labor association, must follow the same requirements specified in the Mexican

22. California's Farm Labor Problems, Part I, p. 127.

National program. The number of such workers employed is charged against the employment ceiling for foreign workers in that area. In this respect the Japanese or Filipino workers are replacing Mexican Nationals.

The program instituted under PL 414 does vary slightly from that created by PL 78. A Japanese worker is obliged to pay for his own transportation from Japan to the United States port of entry and return, whereas the employer pays all of the Mexican National's transportation costs. The term of work under PL 414 is for a period of six months but is renewable at the end of each six months' period to a maximum stay of three years. Virtually all of the Japanese and Filipino Nationals have served the full three-year period, whereas a majority of the braceros work in California for the six-week period specified under their contract although extensions up to 18 months are possible.

The U. S. Department of Labor conducted hearings on the application of PL 414 to seasonal farm labor and on December 19, 1964, a few days before the end of the Bracero Program, issued standards under which Mexicans might be employed. The new standards require that the growers make "reasonable efforts" to recruit domestic workers, offer them a minimum wage and hire them under terms and conditions of employment that were offered to braceros, including a written contract. Under the new standards, the minimum wage set for California workers as of January 1, 1965 was \$1.25 an hour; after April 1, California workers must receive \$1.40 an hour. ²³

Reasonable efforts to recruit workers must include full

23. "You Can Get Braceros If..." California Farmer, 16 January 1965, p. 5.

use of day-haul operations, by which workers are transported to growing areas for work each day and returned each night, and full use, within a reasonable distance, of the interstate clearance process, by which workers are recruited via Farm Placement Service offices in other states if not enough workers are obtained in California.

The Labor Department directive also stated that family housing must be provided for domestic workers where "feasible and necessary" and "reasonable costs of transportation" must be paid by the employer.

According to the California growers, these new regulations erect a solid barrier between them and Mexican laborers. They argue that while they are required to pay \$1.40 an hour, the rest of the states, under the new regulations, will be paying an average of \$1.28 an hour, and those states without a minimum wage schedule may be paying less than a dollar an hour. Moreover, they contend that they cannot hire enough domestic workers who can earn their hire at \$1.40. "That \$1.40 paid to a typical young school drop-out taken from the streets of Oakland or Stockton is more like a wage of \$2.80 an hour in relation to the amount of work this youth can do compared to a hardened Mexican worker used to physical labor." ²⁴

24. "California Gets a Backhand Across the Mouth," California Farmer, 16 January 1965, p. 4.

As time began to run out on the Bracero Program, California growers became more disturbed and argued that there was no indication that the need for supplemental foreign labor in California had diminished. California growers based their beliefs on a report published in September 1964 by the University of California at Berkeley, entitled California Agricultural Labor Requirements and Adjustments. This report indicated that the demand for farm labor would increase through 1969 and suggested that farm labor is unlikely to attract nonfarm workers drawing unemployment insurance or receiving welfare payments. The report concluded that an increased farm wage rate would create economic problems for California farmers and place them at a disadvantage with competing states and countries.²⁵ Dr. Eric Thor, Agricultural Extension Economist and principal author of the Giannini Report, predicted that mechanization, often cited as the solution of California's farm labor problems, may eventually alleviate the seasonality of farm labor requirements but will not do so by 1969, except in the harvesting of the canning tomato.

A study published three months before the end of the Bracero Program questioned the growers' stand. This study made by the Institute of Industrial Relations at the

25. University of California, California Agricultural Labor Requirements and Adjustments, p. 175.

University of California, Los Angeles, indicated that a stable domestic labor force might be established, giving the proper conditions. The report criticized the oft-pronounced theory that domestic labor will not perform the "stoop" labor that is involved with many low-growing crops, such as lettuce, strawberries and asparagus. "Americans have done and continue to do many forms of stoop labor, much of which is harder than any agriculture has to offer...laying hot-tar roofing, cleaning out sewers and cesspools, --all these are unpleasant forms of work that are performed by men who seek such jobs. It is unlikely that the men prefer the work itself, but rather the rewards of such work."²⁶

The UCLA study surveyed urban unemployed workers in Los Angeles County and found that 48.3% of the unemployed who were interviewed would do farm labor under some circumstances.²⁷ The study also found no cultural barriers to doing farm work, only economic ones. The study recommended that farm labor be made more rewarding by covering farm laborers under the State's unemployment insurance system and utilizing the Manpower Development and Training Act to set up centers for labor supply and provide remedial education and skill training for farm workers.

26. Schmidt, After the Bracero, pp. 27-28.

27. Ibid., p. 73.

What is the farm labor situation now that the braceros have gone? Opinions on the post-bracero labor situation appear to be as polarized as they were prior to the program's end. According to the California Department of Employment, the number of seasonal domestic workers employed by the end of January was 8,000 above the same month in 1964. The number of foreign workers was down to 200, compared with 10,700 last year.²⁸ Albert B. Tieburg, Director of the Department, stated that the number of domestic workers in the Imperial Valley crops in January equalled the number of foreign workers there a year ago.

The Council of California Growers quickly challenged these figures, pointing out that January-February is the low point in temporary farm employment in the State, that heavy rains and cold weather slowed activity in the field, and that peak harvest conditions had not been reached. The figures were also challenged as a result of the dismissal of several San Francisco Bay Area County Farm Placement Service officials for exaggerating the number of farm placements made by their offices. Assemblyman Victor V. Veysey of Imperial County charged these were "padded statistics" put forth to convince federal authorities that a sufficient supply of domestic

28. Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1965, Part II, p. 1.

labor was being found to work California crops and that braceros were not needed.²⁹

In February one of California's major crops was harvested for the first time without the aid of braceros. The Department of Employment announced that the harvesting of the Imperial Valley's winter vegetable crop and the first part of the citrus harvest were completed with domestic crews supplemented by a small number -- 300 to 400 -- of foreign workers, most of whom were Japanese working in the United States under PL 414.³⁰

According to growers, however, the Imperial Valley harvest was a fiasco. Ten days prior to the end of the Bracero Program 1200 workers arrived in the valley as a result of the Department of Employment's recruiting drive and the growers' own recruiting efforts. The growers said they found it impossible to assimilate the new workers into the regular bracero crews who were still there under contract. When they faced the possibility of receiving several hundred more inexperienced workers, they cancelled their order for workers.

The cancellation order was considered by many to be a repudiation of the Department of Employment's recruitment efforts, although the growers maintained that weather and a depressed lettuce market had simply brought about a temporary

29. Ibid., 4 February 1965, Part I, p. 20.

30. Sacramento Bee, 8 February 1965, p. 8.

reduction in demand. A meeting between the growers' representative and state officials resulted in a new order being placed, but the growers were not happy. Growers pointed out that the surplus of unskilled field workers coincided with a shortage of skilled field packers, and that the shortage of this latter category was so acute that piece-rate wages for field packing "trios" had escalated to the point that field packers were making thirty to fifty dollars a day. A spokesman for the Council of California Growers commented on one Imperial Valley grower's experience: "His records showed the experienced crew was earning an average of \$2.68 per hour while the referral crew was earning \$1.03. According to his agreement, therefore, a minimum wage of \$1.25 per houru the grower was subsidizing the referral crew an additional 22¢ per hour." ³¹

While the California Department of Employment recruited domestic workers, State officials considered long-range solutions to the farm labor problem. Last November, Governor Brown sent a proposal to Secretary of Labor Wirtz for using Public Law 414 to provide Mexican laborers for California growers over a five-year period. Under the Governor's plan, the number of foreign contract workers would be limited in each state by the establishment of quarterly ceilings. In

31. Imperial Valley Situation, "California Farm Bureau Monthly, February, 1965, p. 7.

1965 these quarter ceilings would be set at 80% of the peak employment, by quarter, of the foreign contract workers, using 1964 as the base year. In each successive year the quarterly ceiling would be set 20% lower than the base year. Following this schedule, contract foreign workers would be eliminated by 1969.

The Governor's proposal also called for annual increases in the minimum wage at which workers may be employed. For 1965, he proposed that the rate be set at 125% of the Secretary of Labor's wage rate used in 1964. This would put the minimum hourly contract wage rate in California at \$1.25. In 1966, this rate would be 140% of the 1964 base; in 1967, 155% of the 1964 base, and in 1968, 170% of the 1964 base, or \$1.70 per hour. In addition, the proposal provided that the guarantees of housing, meals, inspection, transportation costs and contractual agreements which accompanied the Bracero Program be assured to workers brought in under PL 414.³²

Concurrent with his announcement of a five-year phase out of the braceros, the Governor cited the conclusions of the University of California at Los Angeles Institute for Industrial Relations study which showed that there is a potential supply of farm workers among the unemployed. He

32. Statement by Governor Edmund G. Brown, U.S. Department of Labor Hearing, San Francisco, California, 7 December 1964.

stated, however, that the improvements necessary to attract these potential workers could not be made in the near future. He suggested that President Johnson's Economic Opportunity Act-- the anti-poverty program -- could be used as a starting place for farm labor programs and announced that California was drawing up a master plan for migrant farm workers which would take advantage of the anti-poverty program. The master plan, the Governor said, would cover housing, day care centers, health programs, compensatory education, sanitation, training programs, and migrant service centers for traveling workers. To implement the plan, substantial grants from the federal government under the poverty program and under the federal housing programs would be requested.³³

Both labor and the growers attacked the Governor's proposal for using PL 414 over the next five years, the former because the plan calls for the continued use of braceros, although on a gradually reduced scale; the latter because the plan would cut the number of braceros and increase farm labor wages.³⁴ A spokesman for the California Labor Federation (AFL-CIO) commented, "The intent of Congress /to discontinue the Bracero Program³⁵ will be completely undermined if Public Law 414 is invoked for corporate agriculture's benefit."

33. Ibid.

34. Sacramento Bee, 8 December 1964, p. 1.

35. Sacramento Examiner, 8 December 1964, p. 1.

Secretary of Labor Wirtz turned down Governor Brown's proposal pointing out that he had no authorization to assent to a bracero "phase out" program. He declared that he would handle individual shortages on their merits if and when they arose, and issued his December directive which set the minimum wage which must be offered domestic workers before growers can be certified to import foreign labor.³⁶

At his February 23rd news conference, Governor Brown disclosed that he recently sent three new proposals to the Secretary: (1) that Japanese farm workers who are in the United States under PL 414 and are on stand-by status be used by California growers who are in the most need of workers; (2) that the Secretary allow southern California date growers to offer higher piece-rates with the same hourly guarantees as are now required of other growers; and (3) that arrangements be made with the Mexican government to insure prompt processing of Mexican workers into California if their services become necessary within the next month.³⁷

Governor Brown made it clear that he felt that Mexican workers would be needed for harvesting. "...All of the evidence indicates that in the very near future it will be necessary for our Department of Employment to certify to the

36. Mr. Don Larin, Deputy Director, Farm Labor Service, California Department of Employment, 24 February 1965.

37. Sacramento Union, 24 February 1965, p. 1.

to the need for a substantial number of foreign workers to work in our California crops." He pointed out that the Ventura County lemon crop was now short about 1,000 workers in spite of recruiting efforts of state and federal agencies.³⁸

The Governor also announced that he was sending Charles Paul, Director of the California Department of Agriculture, and Albert B. Tieburg, Director of the California Department of Employment, to Washington the next day to confer with Secretary Wirtz in an attempt to gain assurance that arrangements will be made to make Mexican workers available under PL 414.

Pressure is also being applied in Washington by anti-bracero forces who view PL 414 as a means for reviving the foreign contract labor system against which they fought so long. Religious leaders who were active in ending the Bracero Program now plan to ask Congress to amend 414 by adding more specific bars to the admission of foreign workers while domestic workers are unemployed. The effect of such amendment would be to make it virtually impossible for the Secretary of Labor to certify foreign supplemental farm labor under PL 414. The Rev. James L. Vizzard, director of the Washington office of the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, praised Secretary Wirtz for his recent

38. Ibid., p. 6.

rulings on wages, but he added, "What we have to do now is to lift the enormous pressures to soften the provisions of PL 414/ from the Secretary."³⁹

As of March 20, 1965, Secretary Wirtz had authorized the use of 600 of the Japanese and Filipino PL 414 workers in the Ventura County citrus harvest and had assured California Congressmen that he would carry out both "the spirit and the letter" of PL 414. At the same time, he asserted he would make no arrangements with the Republic of Mexico for additional workers until such time as the need for additional workers was demonstrated. Finally, he charged that growers still were not sufficiently cooperative in the recruitment and use of domestic labor.

All parties realize that so far the demand for seasonal farm labor has been relatively light and the major test of the assumptions as to the availability of domestic farm workers which resulted in the termination of PL 78, is yet to come. Particularly at issue is the fate of the canning tomato industry, which used more than half of the 1964 peak bracero supply in California. Present estimates indicate that, in the absence of assurances that foreign labor will be available, the failure of farmers to plant will cut the

39. Oakland Tribune, 14 February 1965, p. 24.

1965 acreage to somewhere between 70,000 to 110,000 acres as opposed to 143,000 acres in 1964.⁴⁰ This will in turn constitute a reduction of up to \$44 million in grower income, and \$150 million in the tomato-generated economy.⁴¹ Growers suggest, and industrialists, bankers, and Teamster's Union officials concur, that the result will be further unemployment of both skilled and unskilled non-agricultural workers. One large tomato processor, Tri-Valley Growers, has already announced the suspension of tomato processing at one plant, and growers predict an irreversible shift in tomato production to other states and countries even with the advent of mechanization.

40. Sacramento Bee, 3-12-65

41. Los Angeles Times, 3-12-64

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